What Is Privileged Access Management (PAM)?
Privileged accounts are the keys attackers want most. What PAM is, how it works, and the core capabilities every PAM program needs.
In this post
- What is privileged access management?
- Why do organizations need PAM?
- What counts as a privileged account?
- What are the core capabilities of PAM?
- PAM vs IAM vs IGA: what’s the difference?
- What are the best PAM tools?
- How do you get started with privileged access management?
- What are the most common PAM mistakes?
- The takeaway
Privileged access management (PAM) is the set of practices and tools an organization uses to control and monitor access to its privileged accounts. The goal is to reduce the risk that comes with those accounts, whether that’s an insider misusing them or an outside attacker stealing the credentials.
What is privileged access management?
Privileged accounts are the ones with elevated permissions: administrator, root and other accounts that can reach sensitive parts of the network and systems. PAM puts controls around them: who can use them, when, from where, with whose approval, and with what record left behind.
A mature PAM program answers four questions for every privileged account:
- Do we know it exists? Discovery and inventory.
- Is the credential protected? Vaulting and rotation.
- Is its use controlled? Approvals, just-in-time elevation, session brokering.
- Can we see what happened? Session recording, audit logs and alerting.
A PAM solution typically includes some combination of credential vaulting, credential injection (so users connect without seeing the password), access approval workflows, session recording, multi-factor authentication and auditing. Newer platforms add endpoint privilege management, secrets management for applications, and cloud entitlement controls.
Why do organizations need PAM?
Because privileged accounts are what attackers want most. If one is compromised, an attacker can get to data and resources they were never supposed to see, and in the worst case take over the entire network.
Look at how most serious intrusions unfold. The initial foothold is often a low-privilege user who clicked something. The damage happens after the attacker escalates: dumps credentials from memory, finds a service account password in a script, or reuses a local admin password that’s the same on every workstation. Ransomware crews in particular depend on domain admin rights to push encryption everywhere at once. PAM is about breaking that escalation path.
PAM makes sure only authorized people can use these accounts, and that what they do with them is recorded. That protects your systems, your data, your intellectual property and, when things go wrong, your reputation. It’s also a recurring line item in audits, cyber insurance questionnaires and frameworks like PCI DSS, SOX, HIPAA and NIST 800-53.
What counts as a privileged account?
More than most people think. The admin accounts IT knows about are usually the minority.
| Account type | Examples | Why it’s risky |
|---|---|---|
| Domain admin | Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Tier 0 accounts | Control of Active Directory means control of everything joined to it |
| Local admin | Built-in Administrator on servers and workstations | Shared or reused passwords enable lateral movement |
| Root and superuser | Linux/Unix root, sudo-enabled accounts, network device enable accounts | Unrestricted control of the host or device |
| Service accounts | Accounts running Windows services, scheduled tasks, databases | Often over-privileged, rarely rotated, nobody remembers who owns them |
| Cloud admin | AWS root, Azure Global Administrator, GCP Organization Admin, high-privilege IAM roles | One console login can delete or exfiltrate entire environments |
| Application and secrets | API keys, database connection strings, CI/CD tokens, hard-coded credentials | Live in code and config where scanners and attackers find them |
| Vendor and third-party | Remote support accounts, MSP access, OEM maintenance logins | Access from devices and people you don’t manage |
| Emergency (break-glass) | Accounts held back for outages | Rarely used, so misuse is easy to miss |
Application, service and machine accounts deserve special mention, because they now outnumber human admins in most environments. Secrets management, covered below, is the main tool for that side of the problem.
What are the core capabilities of PAM?
Credential vaulting and rotation
The foundation. Privileged passwords and keys go into an encrypted vault, users check them out (or never see them at all), and the platform rotates them on a schedule or after each use. Rotation is what turns a stolen password from a permanent problem into a temporary one. The hard part is rarely the vault; it’s rotating service account credentials without breaking the applications that depend on them.
Session management and recording
Instead of connecting straight to a server, admins go through the PAM platform, which brokers the RDP or SSH session, injects the credential, and records what happens. Good session management also lets security watch live sessions, terminate suspicious ones, and search recordings by command or keystroke later. Recordings are the thing auditors and incident responders ask for first.
Least privilege and endpoint privilege management
Removing local admin rights from workstations closes one of the easiest escalation paths. Endpoint privilege management (EPM) tools let users run specific approved applications with elevation without being admins themselves, and control what can run elevated on servers. It’s less exciting than vaulting and often has a bigger impact.
Just-in-time access and zero standing privileges
Standing privilege means an account holds admin rights all the time, whether or not anyone is using them. Just-in-time access grants elevation only for a bounded window, usually tied to an approval or a ticket, and removes it afterward. Taken to its logical end you get zero standing privileges: nobody holds persistent admin rights at all. Most programs land somewhere in between, and that’s fine.
Privileged remote access for vendors
Third parties need into your systems, and the old answer (a VPN account and a shared password) is a gift to attackers. Privileged remote access tools give vendors brokered, recorded, time-limited sessions to specific systems without network-level access. For one example of how that looks in practice, see my BeyondTrust Privileged Remote Access review.
Secrets management for DevOps
Pipelines, containers and applications need credentials too, and they need them at machine speed. Secrets management tools hand out credentials to workloads dynamically, keep them out of source code, and rotate them without a human in the loop. This is often where PAM and platform engineering teams have to learn to talk to each other.
Analytics and threat detection
The last layer watches how privileged accounts behave: unusual logon times, credential use from new hosts, commands that look like reconnaissance, attempts to bypass the vault. On its own this is useful; fed into your SIEM or ITDR tooling it becomes a real detection source.
What I’d look for: When evaluating any of these capabilities, ask the vendor to show service account rotation against an application like yours, not a demo Windows box. Vaulting human passwords is the easy demo. Rotating the credential behind a production database job without an outage is the part that decides whether the project succeeds.
PAM vs IAM vs IGA: what’s the difference?
These get confused, partly because vendors keep merging them.
| IAM | IGA | PAM | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Focus | Authenticating users and granting app access | Governing who should have what access | Controlling high-risk privileged access |
| Scope | Everyone | Everyone’s entitlements | Admin, root, service, cloud and vendor accounts |
| Key tools | SSO, MFA, directories | Provisioning, access requests, access reviews | Vaults, session managers, EPM, JIT elevation |
| Typical question | “Can Sam log in to Salesforce?” | “Should Sam still have Salesforce admin?” | “What did Sam do with domain admin at 2 a.m.?” |
IAM is the broad discipline, IGA is the oversight layer, and PAM is the specialized control set for the accounts that can do the most harm. They work best when they share identity data: IGA should know who’s entitled to PAM access, and PAM should report back what was actually used.
What are the best PAM tools?
There are plenty of PAM tools on the market with different strengths. Arguably the three most popular are:
BeyondTrust Password Safe
An all-in-one PAM solution that approaches security from the asset rather than the account. It covers password management, access control, auditing and threat detection. Policies on the BeyondTrust platform are driven by SmartRules, which group assets and accounts dynamically by attributes so controls follow the system rather than being assigned one account at a time.
CyberArk Privileged Access Manager
CyberArk comes at it from the account level. It covers session recording, password management and privileged session management, organized around the vault, its safes, and platforms that define how each type of account is managed and rotated. It’s the most granular of the three and expects you to invest in that structure.
Delinea (formerly Thycotic)
Delinea offers a range of PAM features, including password management, access control and session monitoring. Secret Server is its well-known vault, and it has broadened into endpoint privilege and cloud controls under the Delinea Platform. It generally has a reputation for being quicker to stand up.
Which one is “best” depends on your environment, so evaluate them against your own requirements rather than someone else’s ranking. I’ve run all three of the big ones in production; here’s how CyberArk, BeyondTrust and Delinea compare.
How do you get started with privileged access management?
Stage 1: Discover and inventory
Start with an inventory of every privileged account in the organization. That means IT admin accounts, but also any other account with elevated access to sensitive data or systems: service accounts, local admins, cloud roles, network devices, vendor accounts. Use discovery scans rather than relying on what people remember. This step usually takes longer than people expect.
Stage 2: Assess risk and prioritize
Next, run a risk assessment to work out which accounts pose the greatest risk and need the strictest controls. Tier 0 (domain controllers, identity providers, the PAM platform itself) and cloud super-admins go first. Use that to choose the PAM solution that fits.
Stage 3: Vault and rotate the critical accounts
Roll it out starting with the most critical accounts. Get domain admin and cloud admin credentials into the vault, rotate them, and remove human knowledge of the passwords. Randomize local admin passwords across endpoints.
Stage 4: Broker and record sessions
Route admin access through the PAM platform so sessions are brokered and recorded. Block direct RDP and SSH to critical systems from anywhere except the PAM jump hosts.
Stage 5: Remove standing privilege
Strip local admin from workstations, introduce endpoint privilege management, and move admin roles to just-in-time elevation with approvals.
Stage 6: Extend to vendors, applications and the cloud
Bring third-party access under privileged remote access, move application credentials into secrets management, and tackle cloud entitlements. Feed everything into your monitoring.
Throughout, write down the policies and procedures for managing privileged access and train people on them. A PAM tool enforces policy. It can’t invent one for you.
In practice: Each stage is a project in its own right, and the jump from stage 3 to stage 5 is where most of the organizational pushback lives. Admins who are happy to have their passwords vaulted are often much less happy to lose standing rights. Plan for that conversation, and bring data on how rarely those rights are actually used.
What are the most common PAM mistakes?
- Treating it as a tool install. Buying the platform is maybe a fifth of the work. Onboarding accounts, changing admin habits and maintaining it is the rest.
- Vaulting without rotating. A password sitting in a vault that hasn’t changed in two years is a slightly better spreadsheet.
- Leaving workarounds open. If admins can still RDP directly to servers, many will. Close the side doors.
- Ignoring service accounts. They’re the hardest to onboard, so they get deferred indefinitely, and they’re often the most over-privileged.
- Forgetting the PAM platform is Tier 0. The vault holds the keys to everything. Harden it, isolate it, restrict its admins and monitor it like a domain controller.
- No break-glass plan. If the vault is down during an outage, how do you get in? Test the answer before you need it.
- Never reviewing who has PAM access. Safe and policy memberships drift like any other entitlement. Include them in access reviews.
The takeaway
PAM is not a quick project. It’s complex to implement, and anyone who says otherwise hasn’t done it. But privileged accounts are where a minor incident becomes a major one, so it’s one of the most worthwhile things a security program can do. Start with discovery, protect the accounts that would hurt most, and work steadily toward less standing privilege.
More on the vaulting, session recording and just-in-time side of things lives in the PAM topic hub.